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This paper explores an empirical methodology to assess the impacts of trade reforms, such
as those being proposed in the WTO Doha Round negotiations, on household behavior in
developing countries. I focus on consumption and income responses. When price reforms
take place, households are aﬀected on both the expenditure and the income sides. By
facing changed prices for consumer goods, households modify consumption decisions. By
facing diﬀerent wages, household income responds. The paper proposes a joint estimator of
demand and wage price elasticities from survey data.
The method uses an empirical model of demand to extract price information from unit
values, and uses this information to estimate the response of households to price reforms. By
correcting unit values for quality eﬀects and measurement error, the method overcomes the
problem of the endogeneity of unit values. By endogeneizing household income, the model
corrects potential biases in the estimation of own- and cross-price elasticities in consumption.
I apply the method to an expenditure and income survey for rural Mexico. It is shown
that using unit values instead of prices may lead to inconsistent results, and that the
corrections suggested in this paper are empirically important. It is also shown that allowing
for consumption and income responses is a key element of an accurate empirical assessment
of trade policy. Concretely, I show that the standard proposition of the literature, that after
an increase in the price of a good net consumers will be worse oﬀ but net producers will be
better oﬀ, may be misleading. In a static context, the welfare eﬀects of a price change can be
assessed by comparing budget shares and income shares. This argument, however, fails to
consider dynamic household responses. Consumers may respond by substituting away from
the more expensive goods. In rural areas, farmers may increase agricultural production, farm
employment and wages, and purchases of inputs and services in local markets. Importantly,
thus, the net position of the household becomes endogenous: suﬃciently large consumption
and income responses may cause an ex-ante net consumer become an ex-post net producer,
thus beneﬁting from the price increase. My empirical application to rural Mexico reveals that
the evaluation of price/trade reforms is indeed sensitive to the inclusion of these consumption
and income responses.1 Introduction
Trade in agricultural products is perhaps one of the most promising instruments for poverty
alleviation in developing countries. This is because agriculture is a key productive activity in
poor countries and because world markets can provide new opportunities for rural producers.
However, international markets for agricultural products have long been distorted by the
policies of developed countries. Policies of domestic support, such as subsidies to production
or exports, and policies of market access, such as tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers, are examples.
Understanding and measuring the impacts of WTO reforms on poor households in developing
countries is therefore critical to the current trade and poverty debate.
When price reforms are implemented, particularly in agriculture, households are aﬀected
both as consumers and as income earners. The standard proposition of the literature is that,
after an increase in the price of a good, net consumers will be worse oﬀ but net producers will
be better oﬀ (Deaton, 1989). In this static context, the welfare eﬀects of a price change can
be assessed by comparing budget shares and income shares. This argument, however, fails to
consider dynamic household responses. Consumers may respond by substituting away from
the more expensive goods. In rural areas, farmers may increase agricultural production, farm
employment and wages, and purchases of inputs and services in local markets. Importantly,
thus, the net position of the household becomes endogenous: suﬃciently large consumption
and income responses may cause an ex-ante net consumer to become an ex-post net producer,
thus beneﬁting from the price increase.
The measurement of the total household welfare eﬀect, one that jointly considers ﬁrst
order eﬀects in consumption and production as well as consumption and income responses,
is the objective of this paper. I propose a joint estimator of demand price-elasticities and
agricultural wage price-elasticities from survey data. The empirical method relies on a
two-step strategy, ﬁrst estimating the responses of household behavior to prices and, second,
linking prices to the reforms. The method requires the estimation of structural models:
household responses are linked to prices through structural parameters that are in turn used
to simulate policy outcomes.1
1Sometimes, standard methods for policy evaluation, such as natural experiments, are not feasible. Trade
1The estimation of these structural parameters requires survey data with suﬃcient price
variation at the household level. This is rarely the case. One possibility is to combine
household surveys with oﬃcial price information. Some studies exploit time and regional
v a r i a t i o ni no ﬃcial prices (Deaton, 1997; Porto, 2003; Ravallion, 1990; Wolak, 1996); others
use community price questionnaires (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2004a; 2004b). In this paper, I
use unit values, the ratio of reported expenditures and quantities, as measures of prices.
The main advantage of using unit values in household models is the substantial
cross-sectional variability. However, unit values are not the same as prices when consumers
jointly choose quantity and quality (Deaton, 1987). Since unit values combine measures
of price and quality, unit values can only be used as proxies for prices. This may lead to
biases in the estimation of the relevant structural parameters. Further, endogenous income
responses generate additional income eﬀects that can bias the estimates of Marshallian
demand elasticities.2 Building on the seminal work of Deaton (1987, 1988, 1990), I develop
methods to correct the estimates of consumption and income responses.
The procedure works as follows. By modeling consumer choices of quantity and quality
simultaneously, I am able to extract the right price signals from unit values, expenditures, and
quality choices. Then, I use this price information to estimate the response of consumption
and wage agricultural income. To do this, I develop a general equilibrium econometric model
of agricultural prices, quantities consumed, unit values, and household income.
I estimate the own- and cross-price elasticities as well as the wage-price elasticities using
survey data for rural Mexico. It is shown that using unit values instead of prices may indeed
lead to inconsistent results, and that the corrections suggested in this paper are empirically
important. On the income side, the endogeneity of unit values and measurement error lead to
attenuation bias in the estimates of the wage elasticities. On the demand side, the correction
for the endogeneity of household agricultural income seems to make a diﬀerence in terms of
both the Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities. These diﬀerences originate in the consistent
estimation of the expenditure elasticities and in the account of the “proﬁte ﬀect”. I also
reforms, which are often accompanied by other simultaneous reforms, are an example. In many instances,
in addition, there is an interest, or a need, to explore the eﬀects of a policy that has not yet taken place.
WTO reforms are an example. The method proposed here accommodates these cases.
2This is a version of the “proﬁte ﬀect” discussed in Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986).
2show that the evaluation of the impacts of an increase in the price of major agricultural
products (like corn) is sensitive to the inclusion of both consumption and income eﬀects, as
well as to the allowance for consumption and income responses.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general motivation and develops
the econometric model. I provide an overview of the methodology and I introduce the general
equilibrium econometric model of consumption and income responses. In section 3, I apply
the methods to the Mexican data and I report the results on the demand and wage income
price-elasticities. Section 4 simulates the welfare eﬀects of the increase in the price of corn
taking into account consumption and income responses of Mexican households. In Section
5, I conclude.
2 The Econometric Model
In most studies of price reforms, such as those summarized in Deaton (1997), the analysis is
based on the responses of household consumption. Standard arguments of eﬃciency, based
on price elasticities, and equity, based on expenditure elasticities, are used to characterize
optimal taxes or to indicate direction of changes in the structure of taxation. This analysis
omits important aspects of the eﬀects of any policy, namely the responses of outputs, wages,
and household income. To estimate the impacts of the reforms both on the expenditure and
income sides, I argue that it is necessary to estimate own- and cross-price elasticities, on the
one hand, and wage-price elasticities, on the other.
Discussions about the poverty impacts of trade reforms often make the argument that
supply responses are critical for the poor. Speciﬁcally, WTO reforms on agricultural trade
are expected to boost production opportunities in rural areas in developing countries.
Proponents of this view argue that agricultural trade liberalization will bring about increases
in international prices of agricultural goods. Faced with higher permanent prices, households
will choose to devote more resources to agricultural production and ﬁrms will increase
their labor demand in agriculture. This higher demand may involve higher employment
in rural farms (for planting, weeding, or harvesting), or it may imply higher labor demand
3in agricultural services (such as sales of fertilizers and tools and farm maintenance).
How can these eﬀects be estimated? With a household survey database containing
information on expenditures and quantities of agricultural goods, a naive model to estimate
the responses of wages to changes in agricultural prices would be to run a regression of
wages on unit values. Let ahc be the agricultural wage income of household h living in region
(cluster) c.L e tlnvg
c be the log unit values of good g reported by households in cluster c.A
simple model would be







where mhc is a vector of controls such as gender, age and marital status of the household
head, his/her education, household size and demographic composition, and time and regional
dummies.
There are three concerns with a regression model such as (1): endogeneity of unit
values, bias due to proxy variables, and measurement error. Endogeneity may arise because
households simultaneously choose quantity and quality. Therefore, unit values are not a
perfect measure of prices. Even when unit values are a good proxy for prices, the model may
estimate the vector γ consistently, but λ inconsistently (i.e., the proxy bias). Measurement
error arises if there are inaccurate responses, mainly on quantities consumed. In all these
cases, OLS estimation of (1) will lead to inconsistent estimates of the wage agricultural
income price-elasticities. The joint estimator developed in this section takes care of all these
problems.
In a general equilibrium model with wage and supply responses, there may be additional
problems in the estimation of own- and cross-price elasticities using standard empirical
models of demand (such as those discussed in Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a). Concretely,
when a fraction of household income responds to price changes, the elasticities will be
inconsistently estimated. To see this, let household preferences over agricultural and
non-agricultural goods be deﬁned by a utility function uh = uh(ch),w h e r ech is a vector
of consumption. Utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint pch = xh. The vector
4of demand functions is ch = ch(p,x h).
In a typical model of demand, total expenditure xh is considered exogenous (both
economically and statistically). In household production models, instead, at least a part
of expenditure can be statistically endogenous (but still exogenous for the household as a
decision maker). In my model, for example, wage agricultural income depends on the prices
of the agricultural goods through changes in demand for labor in agricultural activities. In
consequence, a decline, say, in prices has two sources of income eﬀects: the usual income
eﬀect, whereby real income increases at constant relative prices, and the change in nominal
income caused by the responses of agricultural wage income.
In the development literature, this eﬀect has been labeled “proﬁte ﬀect” in the work
of Barnum and Squire (1979) and Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986). In these household
production models, a change in prices brings about a change in household proﬁts in
agriculture and a change in income. Singh, Squire and Strauss argued that, both in theory
a n di np r a c t i c e ,t h ep r o ﬁte ﬀect could signiﬁcantly alter the magnitude, and even the sign,
of the uncompensated quantity responses. To see this formally, diﬀerentiate the demand of












Further, decompose the price eﬀect captured by the ﬁrst term on the right hand side in the
usual compensated demand change, ∂e ch1/∂p1, and the standard income eﬀect −ch1∂ch1/∂xh















Figure 1 provides an intuition. The initial price vector is p0; at these prices, the consumer
chooses the bundle c0 of goods. Let’s assume that the price of good 1 (with quantities
measured on the horizontal axis) declines and that wage agricultural income ah is negatively
associated with this price. This means that when p1 declines, the budget line ﬁrst
rotates (with nominal income held constant) and then shifts, when ah increases. The ﬁnal
5Figure 1
The ProﬁtE ﬀect and the Marshallian Demand Elasticities












Note: At price p0, the consumer chooses bundle c0. When the price of
good 1 declines, the budget line rotates and shifts outward (if agricultural
wages are negatively associated with p1). The ﬁnal equilibrium is at c1
at prices p1.T h e “ p r o ﬁte ﬀect” generates an additional income eﬀect
that accounts for the diﬀerence between cx
1 and c1
1.
equilibrium at the price vector p1 is at c1. The substitution eﬀect is the movement from c0
1
to cs
1. The standard income eﬀect is the movement from cs
1 to cx
1 and the remaining units,
from cx
1 to c1
1, measure the additional income eﬀect caused by my version of the proﬁte ﬀect,
i.e., the response of household total expenditure through the changes in agricultural wages.
In the case depicted in Figure 1, the consumption of good 1 increases with lower prices. But
it is easy to build cases in which consumption actually declines when prices are lower, even
for a normal good. The joint estimator developed next incorporates these additional income
eﬀects.
2.1 A simpliﬁed Model
The method proposed in this paper combines a model such as (1), with true unobservable
prices instead of unit values as regressors, with the model of demand and quality shading
developed by Deaton (1987, 1988, 1990). In order to introduce the method, I begin by setting
6up a simpliﬁed version of the model with only one good.3
The demand for the good is modeled with an equation characterizing budget shares. For
the moment, I ignore other goods that may complete the system. Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980b) show that a suitable model (that is, a utility consistent model) for the budget share
shc spent by household h in cluster c is
(2) shc = α0 + β0 lnxhc + γ
0
0zhc + θlnπc + fc + u
0
hc,
where xhc is total expenditure, zhc are household demographic characteristics, such as number
of members and demographic composition. πc is a price level that is assumed to be the same
for all households in cluster c; this price is unobservable. fc is a cluster ﬁxed eﬀect and u0
hc
is a standard error term, with zero mean (for a large number of households in each cluster)
and variance σ00.
The endogeneity of unit values can be solved by modeling unit values explicitly. Unit
values are not the same as prices because they are part price and part quality. In fact, changes
in prices and in total expenditure will cause consumers to respond partly by modifying
quantities and partly by modifying quality. I assume that
(3) lnvhc = α1 + β1 lnxhc + γ
0
1zhc + ψlnπc + u
1
hc.
Here, unit values vhc are aﬀected by prices and by household expenditure xhc. The parameter
ψ captures the shading of quality to price changes, and the parameter β1 is called the “quality
elasticity” or the “expenditure elasticity of quality”; β1 would be zero if there were no quality
shading, in which case ψ=1. Demographics zhc determine unit values, too. The error term
u1
hc h a sm e a nz e r o( f o ral a r g en u m b e ro fh in cluster c)a n dv a r i a n c eσ11.
Equations (2) and (3) will be used to extract true price signals from unit values. This
price information is then used to estimate the endogenous determination of household wage
3I describe this artiﬁcial model just to provide an intuition for the more diﬃcult formulas of the full model
of section 3. No attempt to generality or general equilibrium is pursued here.
7agricultural income, ahc.Ir e d e ﬁne (1) as
(4) lnahc = α2 + γ
0
2mhc + λlnπc + u
2
hc,
where mhc are household characteristics that aﬀect wage agricultural income. Some elements
of mhc, such as education, are diﬀerent from the determinants of the budget shares and unit
values. u2
hc is a standard error term. The coeﬃcient λ measures the price elasticity, or the
proportional change in agricultural income brought about by the changes in product prices.
In (4), all households in a given cluster are assumed to face the same price πc.
While consumer prices are relevant in equations (2) and (3), producer prices are more
important in determining wages. For a tradable good with exogenous international prices
and no domestic distortions, producer and consumer prices would be the same. This
interpretation, however, does not allow prices to vary by cluster. In practice, prices vary
regionally because of local taxes, transport costs, and transaction costs. Since information on
unit values in production is not available, I need to rely on consumer prices and unit values
on consumption as a source of variation for producer prices. This is a common problem in
the literature (see Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2004a).
If prices πc were observed, it would be straightforward to estimate a model characterized
by (2) and (4).4 This is a system of equations that can be handled easily with well-known
econometric techniques. But prices πc are not observed. In this model, the identiﬁcation
assumption is that every household in cluster c faces the same prices. This suggests a
two-stage strategy. In the ﬁrst stage, unobserved prices are controlled for with cluster
dummies (which will absorb any ﬁxed eﬀects as well). In the second stage, the elasticities
are estimated by using the information on prices contained in the residuals from the ﬁrst
stage. Details follow.
In the ﬁrst stage, I recover β0, γ0, β1, γ1 and γ2 by consistently estimating the
model, after demeaning all variables (shc, lnvhc, lnahc, lnxhc, zhc,a n dmhc) from cluster
means. Consistency may be achieved with OLS, if expenditures are considered statistically
exogenous, or with IV. I elaborate more on this when I discuss the full model below. With
4Notice that when prices are observed the unit value equation loses its meaning.
8estimates b β0, b γ0, b β1, b γ1 and b γ2, I construct three variables by subtracting the explained part
of the model from the dependent variables in (2), (3) and (4). I get
(5) b y
0










hc =l nahc − b γ
0
2mhc.

























c are average error terms in cluster c (these averages would be zero for a
suﬃciently large number of households per cluster).
Notice that the “residuals” b y0
c, b y1
c,a n db y2
c contain the parameters of interest, θ, ψ,a n d
λ, and unobserved prices. The slope of a regression of b y0
c on b y1
c, taking into account the
covariance of mean cluster errors, is given by
b φ1 =
c cov (b y0
c,b y1
c) − b σ01
nc
d var(b y1






where nc is the (common) number of observations (households) in a cluster c, b σ01 is the
estimated covariance between the residuals in the budget share equations and unit value
equations, and b σ11 is the estimated variance of the residuals of the unit value equation.5
5Deaton (1987) discusses how to amend the formulas for the cases where the number of households is
diﬀerent across clusters and where not every household in a cluster reports both budget shares and unit
values.
9Similarly, the slope of a regression of b y0
c on b y2
c is given by
b φ2 =
c cov (b y0
c,b y2
c) − b σ02
nc
d var(b y2






where b σ02 is the estimated covariance between the residual in the equation for budget shares
and the equation for wage agricultural income and b σ22 is the variance of the residuals in the
wage agricultural income equation.
Without further restrictions on the parameters of the model, it is not possible to separate
b θ, b ψ and b λ from the ratios b φ1 and b φ2. To recover the elasticities, I need to impose more
structure on the relationship between quantities consumed, prices and unit values. Deaton
(1988) developed a group-separable model of demand that delivers a restriction that helps





where  p is the price elasticity of quantity with respect to price π and  x is the total
expenditure elasticity of the group. To interpret (11), notice that it is possible to deﬁne
q u a l i t ys ot h a tu n i tv a l u e sc a nb ew r i t t e na st h ep r o d u c to fp r i c ea n dq u a l i t y( s e eA p p e n d i x
1 for details). Hence, the response of unit value to price is one plus the eﬀect of shading
quality due to higher prices. This depends on the quality elasticity, β1, the price elasticity
 p, and the income elasticity,  x. When price increases,  p captures the reduction in demand
and β1/ x captures the quality eﬀect. If β1 =0or  p =0 , then there is no quality shading
and ψ =1 . When there is quality shading to prices, ψ<1.
To close the model, I need to relate the quantities  p and  x to the estimable parameters.
I do this in Appendix 1, where I derive the empirical restriction that identiﬁes the model.
This is given by
(12) ψ =1+β1
θ




where ba is the average share of wage agricultural income in total expenditure, and s is the
10average budget share. The empirical version of (12) can be combined with the estimates of
b φ1 and b φ2 to solve for b θ, b ψ and b λ. A generalization to the case of many goods follows.
2.2 The Full Model
In this section, I derive the formulas needed to implement the full model, with
many agricultural goods, cross-price elasticities, and several agricultural wage income
price-elasticities. To extend the simpliﬁed model, I begin by rewriting the general formulas
for budget shares, unit values and agricultural wage income. With G goods, the budget




















c is the (log) price of good k in cluster c.A s b e f o r e , fg
c is a ﬁxed eﬀe c ta tt h e
cluster level and u
g0
hc is the error term, with mean zero and variance σ
g
00.T h i si st h eA I D S
model of demand developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b).

















Here, the “quality elasticity” for good g is β
g
1. The error term u
g1
hc has zero mean and variance
σ
g
11. This is just the generalization of equation (3).
There are G equations (13) and (14); instead, there is only one agricultural wage income
equation











hc is an error term. As argued above, changes in prices, particularly of agricultural
goods, will cause some agricultural activities to expand and some others to contract. This,
in turn, will lead to changes in agricultural labor demand and supply and, in the end, to
11changes in the agricultural wage income of rural households. Equation (15) captures these
eﬀects.6
As in the simpliﬁed model, estimation proceeds in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, I demean
budget shares, log unit values and log agricultural income to eliminate prices and cluster ﬁxed
eﬀects. In principle, there is no problem with the consistent estimation of these parameters
if the regressors are exogenous, as in Deaton (1990). Here, however, I am introducing an
agricultural wage income equation and agricultural income may be correlated with total
expenditure. This means that the model will not be identiﬁed if there is correlation between
the errors of the share or unit value equations with the error of the agricultural wage income
equation.
If I assume that this correlation is absent, then the model is triangular and I can estimate
it consistently using OLS equation by equation. This assumption is not necessary. It is
possible to allow for correlation between u2
hc, u1
hc and u0
hc and estimate consistently the
parameters of the demeaned model using instruments in the share and unit value equations.
In particular, since the set of explanatory variables in mhc is diﬀerent from the set of
explanatory variables in zhc, I use the variables that are in m but not in z as instruments.
These exclusion restrictions allow me to fully identify the parameters of the ﬁrst stage. The
parameters of the agricultural wage income equation are identiﬁed provided m is exogenous.7
In the second stage, I subtract the explained part of the model from each of the dependent











































6In section 3, I introduce a simple theoretical model of agricultural labor markets that describes the
economics behind equation (15). Since I build this model to rationalize the empirical results for rural
Mexico, I postpone its presentation until section 3.
7Notice that the model is recursive. That is, agricultural wage income does not depend on total household




c are average error terms in cluster c.
Whereas in the simpliﬁed model I was interested in three parameters, ψ, θ and λ,h e r eI
need to estimate two matrices and one vector of parameters. The matrices are Ψ and Θ,w i t h
gth row denoted by ψg =( ψg1,...,ψgg,...,ψgG) and θg =( θg1,...,θgg,...,θgG), respectively.
The vector of wage elasticities is λ =( λ1,...,λG)0.
To solve for the matrices of parameters, Θ, Ψ,a n dλ, I need to manipulate the model
and introduce some new notation. Let pc be a G×1 vector of the logarithm of (unobserved)
prices in cluster c.S t a c k i n g t h e v e c t o r s p0
c for all clusters, I get a C × G matrix P of







g, where 1C is a C × 1 vector of ones, ψg is the gth row of matrix Ψ
and u1












where Π is the variance-covariance matrix of the vector of good prices (across clusters).
Next, I construct a G × G matrix V1 with element gk given by (19)
(20) V1 = ΨΠΨ
0 + Ω11,
where Ω11 is the matrix with gk element E[u10
g u1
k].
Following the same procedure, I generate the vector b y0
g by stacking the estimated average







g, where θg is the gth row of matrix Θ,a n du0












Next, I build a G × G matrix V10 with element gk given by (21)
(22) V10 = ΨΠΘ
0 + Ω10,
where Ω10 is the matrix with gk element E[u10
g u0
k].
13So far, I have shown how estimation of the model of demand delivers algebraic expressions
involving the unknown matrices Θ and Ψ; these are equations (20) and (22). These equations
can be combined to express one of these matrices as a function of the other. For instance,
by deﬁning a matrix B =[ V1 − Ω11]−1 [V10 − Ω10], it follows that
(23) B
0Ψ = Θ.
This expression has an interpretation in terms of OLS regression coeﬃcients —corrected for
measurement errors— among the average cluster residuals of the unit value and budget share
equations for the diﬀerent goods.
The next step is to develop similar formulas involving the vector λ of wage agricultural
income price elasticities. One option is to combine the agricultural income equation with
the unit value equations. Writing the agricultural income equation for cluster c as a stacked










This allows me to build a G × 1 vector v21 with element g given by (24)
(25) v21 = ΨΠλ + ω21,
where ω21 is a vector with g element E[u20u1
g].N e x t , I d e ﬁne a 1 × G vector B1 =
[v21 − ω21]
0 [V1 − Ω11]
−1,s ot h a t
(26) B1 = λ
0Ψ
−1.
This relationship can also be interpreted as OLS slopes (corrected for measurement error).
To complete the model and solve for the parameters of interest (i.e., the price elasticities),
I need to extend the quality model to many goods. In Appendix 1, I show that the
14generalization of equation (12) is given by






0 + sg(1 − β
g
1)
[θgk + sgbaλk − sgψgk],




0 + sg(1 − β
g
1)) for
good g,a n dav e c t o rs of average budget shares, I can write
(28) Ψ = I + D(ξ)Θ + baD(ξ)D(s)1G ⊗ λ
0 − D(ξ)D(s)Ψ,
where D(ξ) and D(s) are matrices with the elements of vectors ξ and s on the diagonal (and
zero oﬀ-diagonal elements), and 1G is a G×1 vector of ones. The symbol ⊗ is the Kronecker
product.
These are all the steps needed to close the model. The mechanics of the solution involves
using (23), (26) and (28) to solve for the matrices Θ and Ψ, and the vector λ. Replacing
(23) in (28), I get
b Ψ =[ I−D(ξ)B
0 − baD(ξ)D(s)1G ⊗ B1 + D(ξ)D(s)]
−1 .
This matrix is a function of the data. Plugging this into (23) and (26), I solve for b Θ = B0b Ψ
and for b λ0 = B1b Ψ.
The matrix of uncompensated demand elasticities can be estimated with
(29) b E = D(s)
−1b Θ − b Ψ + ba1G ⊗ b λ
0,
and the matrix of compensated, Hicksian demand elasticities, with
(30) b e E = b E + D(ζ)D(s)
−11Gs
0 + baD(ζ)1G ⊗ b λ
0,
where a typical element of the vector ζ is β
g




I exemplify the use of the method by estimating the responses of quantities consumed and
agricultural wage income in rural Mexico. The case of Mexico is, in principle, a good case
study because of the importance of the agricultural sector. Mexico is also close to the United
States, and thus WTO reforms are likely to reach rural producers.
In Mexico, a good source of data is the Household Income and Expenditure National
Surveys, ENIGH (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares). During the
1990s, the data were collected every other year; I use data from the 1994, 1996, 1998, and
2000 rounds. The surveys are representative of the population at the National level, and
cover rural and urban areas. Since I am focusing on the impacts of price reforms on wage
agricultural income, I use the rural modules only. Table 1 reports some summary statistics.
I begin with sample sizes and number of clusters c.T h eE N I G Hi sc a r r i e do u ta td i ﬀerent
weeks in diﬀerent districts. To make the assumption of common prices in a given cluster
c reasonable, I deﬁne them as district-week pairs. There are between 3306 and 5007 rural
households in the samples. There are 1095 clusters in the pooled sample, approximately 275
in each ENIGH round. The number of households interviewed in each “cluster” is typically
larger than in other surveys, with at least 20 households in each of them.
On the consumption side, expenditure data include food and non-food items. Since
quantities are only reported for foodstuﬀ, I estimate the model for the following six goods:
corn, wheat, dairy, oils & fats, meat, and fruits & vegetables. These goods are aggregates
of diﬀerentiated goods within each category. For instance, corn includes own-consumption,
corn grain, and ﬁnely grinded corn; meat includes diﬀerent types of beef, poultry and pork.
These varieties are considered homogeneous goods. Consumers choose diﬀerent varieties of
good, but report expenditures and purchases of consumption aggregates (see Appendix 1). In
rural areas, food consumption includes market purchases and own-consumption. Following
Deaton and Grimard (1992), for instance, we compute unit values using market purchases
only, but budget shares using all expenditure (purchases plus home production).
Fruits & Vegetables, Corn and Meat are the major categories of food expenses in the
sample. Notice that average unit values for all these food products increase in real terms
16from 1994 to 2000.8 As a result, budget shares decline with time. Notice that the number
of households that report quantities (and, thus, unit values) is lower than the number of
households in the sample. This is not surprising.
On the income side, information includes wage earnings, capital income, and other sources
of income. In the estimation that follows, ah is deﬁn e da sw a g ei n c o m ei na g r i c u l t u r a l
activities (farm employment) and self employment income earned in agriculture. This
includes, ﬁrst, income from agricultural production (sell of corn, wheat, etc.). Unfortunately,
the data do not identify the value of sales of diﬀerent crops, but just the total income from
all agricultural activities. Second, the deﬁnition of ah includes wages related to agricultural
activities, like oﬀ-farm employment and rural labor in the ﬁeld. We do not know, however,
whether these wages are earned in corn, wheat, or dairy production. Overall, agricultural
w a g e sa sd e ﬁned above account for around 60 percent of the total income of rural families.
Notice that real wages decline by about 20 percent from 1994 to 2000.
Household characteristics include the size of the family, the demographic composition,
and age, gender, marital status, and educational level. These are the controls that I include
in the estimation of the ﬁrst stage. The educational variables (primary school, secondary
school, college) are assumed to aﬀect the wage income but not the consumption decisions.
In other words, the educational variables are in the vector mhc b u tn o ti nt h ed e m o g r a p h i c
vector zhc.I n t h e ﬁrst stage, I include year dummies to control for the diﬀerent years in
which the surveys were collected.
Since I am studying the agricultural sector in Mexico, I need to discuss PROCAMPO,
a key agricultural policy in the country. PROCAMPO is a program that provides income
support to rural farmers. It was implemented in 1994 to replace the policy of support to
producer prices that was being eliminated at that time. For my purposes, there are two
features of PROCAMPO that I want to highlight. First, the elimination of pan-seasonal
and pan-territorial prices in agricultural commodities implies a movement towards market
prices. This means that the variation in purged unit values that I use to identify the model
truly originates in price diﬀerences across clusters. Second, PROCAMPO subsidies are
8All data on expenditures and wages are expressed in 2002 constant prices. In Table 1, the deﬁnition of
corn excludes “tortillas”.
17decoupled and thus are not set on the basis on current household behavior or outcomes
(like production levels). In other words, lump-sum subsidies are unlikely to aﬀect household
behavior. Further, provided PROCAMPO money is spent in the same way as other sources
on income, the role of these subsidies in demand will be correctly controlled for by including
total household expenditure as a regressor (Case and Deaton, 1998). There are thus good
grounds to believe that the presence of PROCAMPO will not aﬀect the estimates and the
procedure developed in this paper.9
3.1 Household Wage Income
I begin with a discussion of the economics behind the impacts that I am estimating. Suppose
that WTO negotiations succeed and that developed countries eliminate production and
export subsidies as well as trade barriers on agriculture. As international prices increase,
outcomes and behavior in rural households are aﬀected. In general equilibrium, changes in
product prices (corn, for instance) may bring about changes in factor prices (like wages) and
in household income. I want to rationalize these ideas with a theoretical model.10
In rural areas, household members may work in local farms in exchange for a wage, may
work on their own farms, or may work in agricultural activities (provision of services, sales
of inputs). Income derived from all these activities is denoted by ah and is called agricultural
wage income. Wages or other incomes earned in non-agricultural activities are denoted with
ih. For simplicity, I assume that this income ih is exogenous.11 Thus, total household income
xh is given by
xh = ah + ih.
9Notice, however, that there are instances in which PROCAMPO could aﬀect my results. If, for instance,
receiving subsidies encourages some individuals not to participate in labor markets, there might be an
unmeasured eﬀect on wages. Since I am not modeling labor supply in this paper, such eﬀects are left for
future research.
10Notice that in the econometric model, demand, quality, and agricultural wage income were jointly
analyzed. However, since consumption choices can be easily modeled with well-known models of utility
maximization, and quality choices can be handled with restrictions on preferences (see Appendix 1), I focus
on the behavior of agricultural factor markets.
11In order to derive income eﬀects on the demand side, it is necessary to have some exogenous income and
Ia s s u m et h a tih plays this role (instead of adding an additional term, x0
h, in the equation). Although this
assumption is not really necessary, it makes the empirical estimation more tractable.
18I discuss how ah is aﬀected by a change in agricultural prices. I assume that there are
two types of agricultural activities: ag1 comprises activities related to growing crops; ag2,
instead, are activities related to animals, such as animal husbandry or production of dairy
products. There are three diﬀerentiated labor inputs in rural areas: agricultural labor of
type 1 (with total supply L1), agricultural labor of type 2 (with supply L2), and mobile labor
(with supply Lm). L1 is speciﬁc to agricultural activities 1. This includes labor for planting,
weeding, harvesting, etc. I assume there are many agricultural activities ag1
j in sector 1; the
common feature of activities j is that they use L1 intensively. For instance, one activity can
be growing corn and another, growing fruits & vegetables. Both activities require workers
with agrarian skills. Similarly, there may be several activities k in sector 2, denoted ag2
k.
Animal husbandry, veterinary services, etc. are examples. Activities 1 and 2 share mobile
labor Lm. Notice that since labor types L1, L2,a n dLm are diﬀerentiated inputs, they can
earn a diﬀerent wage.




j ), where l1
j is employment
of speciﬁc factor 1, and lm
j is employment of mobile labor. There may be other factors used
in the production of j (such as land or capital), but I omit this discussion for simplicity.
Producers of agricultural activities j in sector 1 (corn, for instance) face exogenous prices
p1
j, which depend on international prices and domestic conditions such as transport or








where w1 is the agricultural wage in sector 1, wm i st h ea g r i c u l t u r a lw a g eo fm o b i l el a b o r ,
and p is a vector of agricultural price products.
































With endogenous factor supplies, L1, L2,a n dLm are a function of several determinants of















for r =1 ,2,m. This equation shows how the agricultural wage income of the household
(which is composed of w1, w2 and wm) depends on the prices of agricultural goods.
T h e r ei so n ei m p o r t a n tc l a r i ﬁcation that I should make. The goal of this section is to
estimate functions relating agricultural wages, ah, with agricultural prices. In the data,
households report agricultural wages without identifying the agricultural activities on which
wages are earned (type 1, type 2 or mobile). This means that I will only be able to estimate
the average response of agricultural income in the diﬀerent agricultural activities. This will
be a weighted average of the responses of w1, w2 and wm.
T os e et h i s ,s u p p o s et h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et oe s t i m a t ew a g e sa saf u n c t i o no fp r i c e s .D e n o t e
the response of the log of w1 to the log of price g as β
g




elasticities of w2 and wm with respect to pg, respectively. In the full model, I identiﬁed λg












where µr are weights given by the share of each type of labor on total labor supply. This
equation shows that the average response of agricultural wage income can be positive or
negative depending upon the relative importance of the diﬀerent types of labor and the
diﬀerential responses of w1, w2 and wm to prices.
Figure 2 plots the equilibrium in a standard speciﬁc factor framework. The horizontal
size of the box measures Lm, the total labor supply of mobile labor. The curve labeled l1
is the value of the marginal product of mobile labor in agricultural activities of type 1. As
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Note: The length of the horizontal box is the supply of mobile labor Lm;i t s
wage is wm.T h e c u r v e s l1
1 and l1
2 represent the labor demand in activities of
type 1 (which use speciﬁc labor L1). The total demand of this speciﬁc labor is
l1. The total labor demand in activities of type 2 is l2.
drawn, there are two such activities, say corn and fruits & vegetables. The curve l2 represents
the demand for mobile labor in agricultural activities of type 2. For simplicity, there is only
one activity in sector 2, namely dairy.
In the Figure, I have purposely assumed a much larger demand for labor in activities 1
than in activities 2. Accordingly, an increase in prices p1
1 or p1
2 (the prices of corn and fruits
& vegetables) would shift l1 up, causing wm to increase. In addition, while w1 would increase
as well, w2 would decline. In contrast, an increase in p2
1 ( t h ep r i c eo fd a i r y )w o u l dc a u s e
wm and w2 to increase, but w1 to decline. In consequence, the situation plotted in Figure 2
suggests that increases in the prices of corn or fruits & vegetables would most likely cause
average wage income to increase, but increases in the price of dairy would most likely cause
wage income to decline. It is clear that, theoretically, anything can happen and that wage
income can increase or decrease. This is, in the end, an empirical question which I address
next.
Results are reported in Table 2. In column [1], I report the estimates of λg from a naive
model that uses average cluster unit values as regressors. I ﬁnd that ahc is positively and
21signiﬁcantly associated with corn prices, with an elasticity of 0.58 and a t-statistic of 5.65.12
Apart from the price of meat, which appears to aﬀect wage agricultural income positively too,
the remaining prices are statistically insigniﬁcant. These results suggest that the problems
associated with the use of unit values as regressors in the wage equation may indeed be
present. Attenuation bias due to measurement error, for instance, may be critical: all unit
value regressors, except for corn and meat, are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The remaining columns of Table 2 report results from the full model. In each speciﬁcation
and for each of the six price regressors, I report two elasticities, one for the model with
exogenous expenditure in the share and unit value equations, and another for the model
that uses instrumental variables in these equations. Following Deaton (1997), the standard
errors are estimated with bootstrap methods by resampling the second stage and keeping
constant the parameters of the ﬁrst stage.
I begin by discussing the model with instrumental variables (column [2]). The prices
of corn and fruits & vegetables are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with household
agricultural wage income. The elasticity of corn is 0.40, and that of fruits & vegetables,
1.29. In contrast, the price dairy is negatively associated with agricultural income, with an
elasticity of −1.10. There is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the prices of wheat, oils &
fats, and meat.
There is an intuitive interpretation of these results. Corn and Fruits & Vegetables are
arguably agricultural activities of type 1, which employ a large fraction µ1 of the workforce.
When the prices of these goods increase, the demand for mobile labor and speciﬁc labor of
type 1 increase. This leads to increases in the wages of mobile labor and on the return to
speciﬁc agrarian labor. When the price of dairy increases, instead, there is also an increase
in the demand for mobile labor. However, this increase in wm causes a decline in the surplus
accruing to speciﬁc labor of type 1. If agrarian activities ag1
j are important enough, average
agricultural income may decline in the end.
In column [3], I report the OLS estimates (assuming exogeneity of expenditure in the
ﬁrst stage estimation of the share and unit value equations). It is found that higher corn
12Notice that the standard errors are corrected for clustering since all households in a given cluster face
the same averages for the unit values.
22prices are associated with higher agricultural wage income, whereas higher prices of dairy
products negatively aﬀect agricultural income. No statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect is found in
the rest of the cases, including fruits & vegetables.
Based on the estimates in Table 2, the price of corn seems to be systematically related
with agricultural wage income, the relationship being positive and signiﬁcant in all models.
The use of average unit values as regressors in the naive model may be incorrect, however.
First, dairy and fruits & vegetables have statistically signiﬁcant impacts on household wage
agricultural income in the Full Model. In addition, the price of meat, which is positively
related with ah in the naive model, it is no longer signiﬁcant in the Full model. Since the
Full method is robust to the inconsistencies that arise when using unit values as proxies
for prices, the corrections of my method seem important. In one case, namely corn, the
models deliver comparable elasticities; but in three out of the remaining ﬁve cases, results
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
The formulas for the joint estimator proposed in this paper are quite complex.
Speciﬁcally, the full model requires the estimation of a complete system of demand and
agricultural wage income, which implies a lot of work to prepare and compute the matrices
of section 2. If the estimator is going to be used in the evaluation of policies, it seems
important to inquire if slightly modiﬁed versions of the model can help simplify the formulas.
In addition, since the model can only estimate linear regression functions for household
outcomes, it may not be used in cases where the outcome involves discrete choices (such as
labor supply decisions). Finally, since the model estimates a large number of parameters,
there might be eﬃciency concerns.
A promising alternative is to assume that unit values are only aﬀected by own prices, so
that the cross-price eﬀects in equation (14) are zero. This is, in fact, not a strong assumption,
since the full model delivers, in the end, estimates of the oﬀ-diagonal elements of Ψ that are
very close to zero.13 The diagonal elements of Ψ are instead estimated. Estimation can be
carried out as in section 2, but replacing b Ψ with e Ψ, a diagonal matrix with the elements b ψgg
13These estimates are not reported in this paper to save some space. Similar results are obtained by
Deaton and his coauthors in all their applications of the methodology to demand analysis. See Deaton
(1997), Deaton and Grimard (1992), and Deaton, Parikh, and Subramanian (1994).
23in the diagonal, and zero oﬀ-diagonal elements. Results are in columns [4] and [5] of Table 2.
As expected, this version of the model improves the OLS estimation of the naive model and
delivers estimates that are close to those in the Full model. This is because the estimates
b ψgk are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Alternative 1 seems to be a good compromise
between the Full model, which may be quite complicated to estimate and not be ﬂexible
enough in some applications (see Balat and Porto, 2004).
3.2 Own- and Cross-price Elasticities
There are two reasons why the elasticities estimated from the full model can diﬀer from the
elasticities in Deaton (1990) model. One issue is that the estimated expenditure elasticities
and quality elasticities may be inconsistent if a fraction of household expenditure (the fraction
that depends on agricultural wage income) depends on agricultural prices. The second issue is
the presence of the “proﬁte ﬀect” the additional income eﬀect generated by the endogenous
response of household income. In this section, I assess empirically how important these
problems are by comparing the results obtained from the full model with those obtained
from Deaton’s model.
In Table 3, I report estimates of the expenditure elasticity (or income elasticity) of
demand. I begin by discussing the estimates of β
g
0 in columns [1] and [2]. Results are
mixed: for corn, wheat, and dairy, the estimates from the Full and Standard Models are not
too diﬀerent. These diﬀerences are perhaps larger in the remaining three goods, oils & fats,
meat, and fruits & vegetables. This suggests that the correction for endogeneity may be
important in practice. These patterns are less evident in the case of the quality elasticity of
expenditure (columns [3] and [4]), where the elasticities are not diﬀerent (with the exception
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displayed in columns [5] and [6]. Notice that there are some diﬀerences in the estimated
elasticities from the two models, particularly in the case of dairy.
I turn next to discuss the demand elasticities. Table 4 shows the estimates of the
uncompensated (Marshallian) and compensated (Hicksian) own-price elasticities for three
models. These are Deaton’s original model, the Full Model with instrumental variables, and
24Alternative 1 (with Ψ = e Ψ). I ﬁnd that all the own-price elasticities, compensated and
uncompensated, are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Comparing Deaton’s model with
the Full Model, I ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the own-price elasticities for the cases of corn,
dairy, and fruits & vegetables. For wheat, oils & fats, and meat, the corrections suggested
here are less important. Alternative 1, which only estimates the own-price responses of
unit values, produces results that are close to those of the Full Model. Standard errors are
somewhat smaller, indicating that there may indeed be gains in precision in using Alternative
1 since a lower number of parameters is being estimated. Similar conclusions emerge from
the study of the compensated own-price elasticities.
It is instructive to decompose the diﬀerences in the own-price elasticities between the
diﬀerent models. This decomposition can shed some light on the relative importance of the
two factors that explain these diﬀerences. One is the correction that allows for the consistent
estimation of expenditure elasticities (in demand and in unit values —or quality); the other
factor is the “proﬁte ﬀect”. The decomposition is shown in Table 5 for the case of the
uncompensated demand elasticities.
Column [1] reproduces the own-price elasticities from Deaton’s model with exogenous





1 that would arise if household income were endogenous. To do
this, I reestimate Deaton’s model (without the wage equation) using instrumental variables
for household expenditure. The role of the “proﬁte ﬀect” can be illustrated by comparing
columns [2] and [3], instead. In the case of corn, the two corrections of this paper decrease
the estimated elasticity. The correction for the endogeneity of xh is less important than
the “proﬁte ﬀect.” In the case of dairy, the corrections of the paper drive the elasticity
up, from −1.28 to −1.39, due to endogeneity, and further up to −2.29, due to the proﬁt
eﬀect. It follows that most of the diﬀerences in the estimated elasticities is explained by
this last eﬀect — intuitively, an increase in the price of dairy (which reduces consumption)
reduces agricultural wage income (with an elasticity of −1.1 in Table 2) and causes a negative
income eﬀect that pulls consumption of dairy further down. An interesting case is fruits &
vegetables, where the correction for endogeneity is not really important but the addition
25of the proﬁte ﬀect renders the demand elasticity statistically insigniﬁcant. This is because
the increase in the price of fruits & vegetables has a strong wage eﬀect, and thus a strong
positive income eﬀect.
To better understand the role played by the “proﬁte ﬀect”, notice that the additional
income eﬀects caused by the response of household income to prices have two eﬀects on
consumer choices. First, by facing changed incomes, households modify consumption choices
according to the expenditure elasticity. Second, consumers modify their quality choices
according to the quality elasticity of expenditure. This means, ﬁrst, that there is an
additional term in the income eﬀects in demand, and, second, that there is an income eﬀect
on quality choices (the third term on the right hand side of (28)).
I separate these two eﬀects in the last two columns of Table 5. In column [4], I correct the
matrix Ψ in (28) by including the term baD(ξ)D(s)1G⊗λ0, but I exclude the term ba1G⊗λ
in equation (29). This term is computed in column [5]. It is observed that the additional
income eﬀect in consumption generated by the proﬁte ﬀect is much more important than
the quality shading eﬀect of the additional income. Indeed, in column [4], all the eﬀects are
small.
For completeness, I report the full set of own- and cross-price compensated and
uncompensated demand elasticities for the full model in Table 6. The cross-price elasticities
are generally small, and not always statistically signiﬁcant. This result is in line with those
reported in many previous studies and summarized in Deaton (1997).
4 Net Consumers and Net Producers
In this section, I use the estimated elasticities to assess the role of consumption and income
responses in the evaluation of the welfare eﬀects of a price change. Since the pioneering
work of Deaton (1989) in Thailand, it is customary to state that, after a price increase,
net consumers will be hurt while net producers will be beneﬁt e d . T h eo p p o s i t eh a p p e n s
after a drop in prices. I argue here that, while this prediction is true in a static scenario, it
may be misleading in a more dynamic setting where households can adjust consumption and
26income. In this case, the net position of the household is endogenously determined. Indeed,
if household responses are large enough, it is possible for some net consumers to become net
producers and be actually beneﬁted by the price increase.
I illustrate these scenarios by exploring the corn sector, a key commodity produced in
rural Mexico. For the sake of exposition only, I work with an increase in the price of corn.14
Following the usual practice is this literature (Deaton, 1989; 1997), I deﬁne the welfare eﬀects
of the price change as the compensating variation expressed as a share of total household
expenditure. In Figure 3, the average welfare eﬀects are plotted against the log of household
per capita expenditure. The averages are estimated non-parametrically with locally (kernel)
weighted regressions. The static impact of the price increase is given by the diﬀerence
between the share of income from corn production and the share of corn expenditure in total
consumption. I plot this diﬀerence with a solid line. As expected, households at the bottom
o ft h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o na r en e tc o n s u m e r sa n dh o u s e h o l d sa tt h et o pa r en e tp r o d u c e r so f
corn. In consequence, a price increase hurts the poor but beneﬁts the rich.
I turn now to income responses. I plot the welfare eﬀects with a broken line. Here,
income responses are allowed but consumption choices are kept constant. In my model,
this means that the agricultural wage income of the household, including corn production
and wages from local agricultural markets, react to the increase in the price of corn. This
response is characterized by the income shares of agricultural wages and the elasticity of 0.4
reported in Table 2. Instead, consumption impacts are still measured with budget shares.
In this scenario, an increase in corn prices would beneﬁt households across the entire income
distribution. The intuition is that agricultural income and agricultural wages are responding
to the price increase.
To account for consumption responses, I estimate ﬁrst and second order impacts using
the corn budget share and the own-price elasticity.15 In Figure 3, I graph these welfare
14The increase in prices may be due to liberalization of corn world markets (as in the Doha development
round), or other factors (like domestic agricultural reforms). There are two important issues regarding these
price changes: the actual price change induced by the reforms (like Doha) and the pass-through rate to
farmers. Even with credible estimates of price increases, segmentation of domestic markets may cushion
farmers from international markets. These are important issues, but they are not the topic of the present
paper.
15For simplicity, cross price eﬀects are not computed. Although it is easy to do so given the cross-price
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Note: The lines represent the average welfare eﬀects (compensating
variations) as a share of household expenditure. The averages are
estimated with non-parametric locally weighted regression using a
Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth equal to 0.5. The solid line displays
the ﬁrst order eﬀects given by the diﬀerence between corn budget shares
a n dc o r ni n c o m es h a r e s . T h eb r o k e nl i n e sa l l o w sf o ri n c o m er e s p o n s e s
and the dotted line, for income and consumption responses.
eﬀects with a dotted line. It is clear that allowing for consumption responses makes the
gains even higher. The reason is that consumers reduce quantities when prices increase
so that consumption losses are in the end ameliorated. Notice also that the adjustment of
consumption generates larger gains at the bottom of the income distribution. This is because
corn is one of the major staples of the poor and the adjustment of quantities thus makes a
larger diﬀerence for them.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has introduced an empirical model designed to be used in the evaluation of price
reforms. These reforms aﬀe c th o u s e h o l d sb o t ha sc o n s u m e r sa n da sp r o d u c e r so ri n c o m e
earners. Studying consumption eﬀects is relatively straightforward. Budget shares can be
used to approximate ﬁrst order eﬀects. Deaton’s methods (Deaton, 1987, 1988, and 1990)
elasticities that I have estimated, the simpler approach of Figure 3 is, I believe, much clearer.
28can be used to estimate demand elasticities and second order eﬀects.
The estimation of labor income eﬀects is harder due to lack of price variability at the
household level. The simple idea of using unit values as a proxy for prices, which would
deliver enough price variation, is problematic because of endogeneity of unit values, biases
due to proxy variables, and measurement error. In this paper, I have proposed a method
that uses unit values as measures of prices, but that is free from these problems. The method
combines Deaton’s model of demand with an equation that describes the agricultural wage
income of the household. By estimating the demand model together with the quality shading
model, I was able to extract the right price signal from unit value data. These data can then
be plugged into the wage equation to identify the relevant elasticities.
When a fraction of household income is allowed to be endogenous, there are additional
eﬀects to consider in the estimation of the demand parameters. First, there is the “proﬁt
eﬀect”whereby a change in an agricultural price causes a change in household income and
additional income eﬀects in consumption. Second, the change in household income brings
about further quality shading responses that aﬀect the elasticities of demand. In this paper,
I have derived formulas to correct for these factors.
The method was applied to the estimation of consumption and agricultural wage income
responses to agricultural prices in rural Mexico. It was found that the corrections suggested
in this paper can make a diﬀerence and should be preferred to a simpler model that uses
average cluster unit values as regressors. Failing to control for endogeneity, biases, and
measurement errors may lead to inconsistent estimates of the price elasticities and to an
incorrect or misleading evaluation of policy changes. In addition, I have assessed the role of
consumption and income responses in the evaluation of trade reforms. I have shown that the
proposition that net consumers will be hurt by price increases whereas net producers will be
beneﬁted is only true in a static scenario. When consumers adjust quantities, farmers adjust
production, and local labor markets react to the changed prices, so that net consumers can
become net producers, thus beneﬁting from price increases. Data from rural Mexico support
these ﬁndings.
29Appendix 1: Quality Model
This Appendix describes the model of quantity and quality used in the paper to extract
price information from unit values. Within aggregates of goods, such as corn, there are
diﬀerent varieties that a consumer can choose. Low quality corn would comprise whole grain
maize or badly grinded grains. High quality corn may comprise, for example, high-quality,
ﬁnely-grinded maize meal. Unit values are not the same as prices because households choose
quantity and quality simultaneously. In order to derive the formulas used in the text, I need
to develop a model of consumer choices (allowing for a choice of quantity and quality) and
I need to specify a suitable deﬁnition of quality. To do this, I follow Deaton (1987, 1988,
1990).
Let g be a group of goods, such as corn. This group comprises many varieties of
homogenous goods, with price vector in cluster c denote by pcg. Since each good within
group g is homogenous, the elements of pcg represent true prices, not unit values. For a
typical household in cluster c, there is a quantity vector qcg, such that total expenditure on
corn is xcg = pcgqcg. I assume that the price vector pcg can be decomposed into an aggregate





This requires the existence of a linearly homogeneous function πcg(pcg) such as a standard
price index with ﬁxed weights. Notice that aggregate prices are allowed to vary across
clusters c while the relative prices are held constant.
The deﬁnition of quality adopted here is based on a comparison of relative prices: more
expensive goods are assumed to be higher quality goods. To make this deﬁnition more
precise, let Qcg be the quantity consumed of the aggregate good g ( i . e .c o r n ) .Ia s s u m et h a t
Qcg = kgqcg,w h e r ekg is deﬁn e di ns u c haw a yt h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et oa g g r e g a t et h eq u a n t i t i e s
consumed of the homogenous goods in qcg.A s a n e x a m p l e , l e t qcg be measured in kilos,
and kg be a vector of ones. Then, Qcg is just the total kilograms of corn consumed by the






This deﬁnition implies that quality is higher when there is a higher quantity consumed of
the more expensive goods. In fact, the price per kilo of corn variety i is p0
gi/kgi,a n dv a r i e t i e s
with higher ratios are higher-quality varieties. This last assumption is needed to justify
the deﬁnition of quality. In this model, thus, expenditure can be written as the product of
quantity Qcg,p r i c eπcg,a n dq u a l i t yξcg.
To close the quality model, I need to impose some structure in preferences, which are
henceforth assumed to be separable in the diﬀe r e n ta g g r e g a t e so fg o o d s . T h i sm e a n st h a t










30Quality is a function of quantities qcg, reference prices p0
g, and the quantity aggregator kg.
Since p0























where δgk is the Kronecker delta.
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Now, remember that unit values are the product of price and quality, (lnvg =l nπg +l nξg);




















To end, we need to write the restriction imposed by the assumption of separable preferences
in terms of the parameters of the model. Unit value, the ratio of expenditure and reported







Expenditure on good g is equal to the budget share sg times total expenditure x,o rlnxg =





where θgk is the cross-price elasticity of budget shares and baλk captures the change in total
expenditure caused by the factor income eﬀects of higher prices (see text). Replacing (A12)




+ baλk −  
gk
p .





















Equation (27) in the text follows from the combination of (A10), (A11), (A14), and (A15).
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1994 1996 1998 2000
Sample Sizes
households 5007 4684 3925 3306
clusters 275 269 277 274
Corn
avg. budget share 8.01 0 .89 .56 .4
avg. log unit value 0.20 0.82 1.18 1.40
number of obs. in eq (3) 3128 3127 2693 2364
Wheat
avg. budget share 3.03 .53 .12 .4
avg. log unit value 1.47 2.24 2.38 2.54
number of obs. in eq (3) 3657 3415 2816 2491
Dairy
avg. budget share 3.33 .63 .83 .1
avg. log unit value 1.55 2.01 2.38 2.54
number of obs. in eq (3) 2348 2254 1947 1881
Oils & Fats
avg. budget share 2.02 .52 .21 .4
avg. log unit value 1.33 2.23 2.30 2.31
number of obs. in eq (3) 2615 2681 1911 1710
Meat
avg. budget share 7.46 .86 .95 .6
avg. log unit value 2.36 2.91 3.22 3.33
number of obs. in eq (3) 3038 2905 2436 2330
Fruits & Vegetables
avg. budget share 11.81 2 .11 3 .29 .1
avg. log unit value 1.16 1.66 2.11 2.10
number of obs. in eq (3) 4367 4222 3435 2950
Agricultural Wages
avg. (log) 6.65 6.41 6.44 6.45
share of total income 62.06 1 .16 2 .35 9 .2
number of obs. in eq (4) 2923 2597 1937 1607
Avg. per capita expend. (log) 6.28 6.21 6.14 6.54
Household size 5.15 .24 .74 .6
Males 50.65 0 .25 0 .15 0 .1
≤ 16 yrs. 39.23 8 .53 5 .53 4 .9
> 16 & ≤ 60 yrs. 48.84 9 .44 9 .74 9 .8
> 60 yrs. 12.01 2 .11 4 .91 5 .2
Years of education 3.03 .53 .43 .5
Note: Own calculations based on the Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares (ENIGH).
35Table 2
Applying the Methodology
Naive Full Model Alternative 1
Model IV OLS IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corn 0.58 0.40 0.64 0.39 0.67
(0.10) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21)
Wheat −0.05 −0.28 −0.26 −0.37 −0.29
(0.13) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)
Dairy −0.07 −1.10 −0.59 −1.08 −0.59
(0.06) (0.18) (0.15) (0.19) (0.14)
Oils & Fats −0.01 −0.48 −0.78 −0.44 −0.72
(0.30) (0.65) (0.53) (0.63) (0.51)
Meat 0.45 −0.45 −0.09 −0.42 −0.05
(0.20) (0.27) (0.28) (0.25) (0.27)
Fruits & Vegetables 0.10 1.29 0.43 1.31 0.43
(0.18) (0.47) (0.41) (0.49) (0.41)
(1) Naive model with average cluster unit values (standard errors are cluster corrected)
(2) Full Model using instrumental variables
(3) Full Model using OLS
(4) and (5) Alternative 1: ˜ Ψ = D(vecdiag(b Ψ))
All models include additional controls, such as demographics, education, age, gender and
year dummies. The standard errors (in parenthesis) for the models in columns (2) to (5)
are computed by bootstrapping the second stage.
36Table 3
Expenditure Elasticities
β0 β1  x Average






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Corn −0.041 −0.042 0.094 0.126 0.441 0.396 0.088
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.050)
Wheat −0.006 −0.009 0.064 0.087 0.721 0.614 0.030
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.025)
Dairy −0.001 −0.004 0.019 −0.018 0.964 0.903 0.035
(0.001) (0.003) (0.020) (0.068)
Oils & Fats −0.007 −0.015 0.018 −0.006 0.632 0.290 0.020
(0.0002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.016)
Meat 0.011 0.001 0.075 0.113 1.089 0.906 0.064
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.019)
Fruits & Vegetables −0.045 −0.055 0.009 0.015 0.598 0.505 0.115
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.040)
(1) and (2) Expenditure elasticity of budget shares (β0) for Deaton and Full Model
( 3 )a n d( 4 )Q u a l i t yE l a s t i c i t y( β1) for Deaton and Full Model
(5) and (6) Expenditure elasticity of demand ( x) for Deaton and Full Model
(7) Average budget Share in the sample
Standard errors in parenthesis
37Table 4
Compensated and Uncompensated Own-Price Elasticities







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corn −0.92 −0.65 −0.66 −0.88 −0.61 −0.62
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
Wheat −1.34 −1.44 −1.44 −1.32 −1.43 −1.43
(0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13) (0.12)
Dairy −1.28 −2.29 −2.12 −1.24 −2.28 −2.11
(0.12) (0.24) (0.23) (0.12) (0.24) (0.23)
Oils & Fats −0.77 −1.07 −1.04 −0.76 −1.07 −1.03
(0.34) (0.63) (0.64) (0.34) (0.63) (0.64)
Meat −1.35 −1.46 −1.46 −1.28 −1.42 −1.42
(0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.24)
Fruits & Vegetables −0.90 −0.12 −0.10 −0.83 −0.01 0.00
(0.13) (0.30) (0.32) (0.13) (0.31) (0.33)
Note: Deaton Model is based on Deaton (1990). The Full Model is estimated with instrumental
variables. Alternative 1 uses ˜ Ψ = D(vecdiag(b Ψ)). Standard errors in parenthesis.
38Table 5
Decomposition of Uncompensated Own-Price Elasticities
Deaton Model and Full Model with Instrumental Variables
ProﬁtE ﬀect Endogeneity Full
Quality Income Deaton
of hh income Model
Eﬀect Eﬀect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corn −0.92 −0.83 −0.65 −0.06 0.24
(0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.12)
Wheat −1.34 −1.24 −1.44 0.03 −0.23
(0.09) (0.08) (0.13) (0.02) (0.12)
Dairy −1.28 −1.39 −2.29 −0.23 −0.67
(0.12) (0.14) (0.24) (0.05) (0.11)
Oils & Fats −0.77 −0.80 −1.07 0.01 −0.29
(0.34) (0.38) (0.63) (0.03) (0.40)
Meat −1.35 −1.23 −1.46 0.05 −0.28
(0.22) (0.19) (0.24) (0.03) (0.17)
Fruits & Vegetables −0.90 −0.86 −0.12 −0.04 0.79
(0.13) (0.13) (0.30) (0.02) (0.29)
Note: Estimates based on the Full model with instrumental variables.
39Table 6
Uncompensated and Compensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities
Full Model with Instrumental Variables





Corn −0.65 0.33 0.95 0.24 0.04 0.13
(0.09) (0.13) (0.26) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12)
Wheat 0.00 −1.44 −0.05 −0.96 −0.16 −0.30
(0.11) (0.13) (0.28) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12)
Dairy −0.34 −0.55 −2.29 −0.87 −0.63 −0.76
(0.09) (0.11) (0.24) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12)
Oils & Fats −0.37 −0.00 −0.38 −1.07 −0.39 −0.00
(0.32) (0.41) (0.85) (0.63) (0.50) (0.45)
Meat −0.30 −0.21 0.31 −0.14 −1.46 −0.09
(0.15) (0.18) (0.38) (0.27) (0.24) (0.20)
Fruits & Vegetables 0.54 0.66 0.86 1.41 1.29 −0.12
(0.24) (0.29) (0.64) (0.43) (0.32) (0.30)
(b) Compensated Elasticities
Corn −0.61 0.38 1.03 0.27 0.13 0.19
(0.09) (0.13) (0.27) (0.18) (0.13) (0.12)
Wheat 0.01 −1.43 −0.04 −0.96 −0.14 −0.30
(0.11) (0.13) (0.28) (0.17) (0.14) (0.12)
Dairy −0.35 −0.54 −2.28 −0.86 −0.64 −0.78
(0.10) (0.12) (0.24) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12)
Oils & Fats −0.38 0.00 −0.37 −1.07 −0.39 −0.01
(0.33) (0.42) (0.86) (0.63) (0.51) (0.47)
Meat −0.29 −0.18 0.36 −0.13 −1.42 −0.08
(0.16) (0.18) (0.39) (0.27) (0.25) (0.20)
Fruits & Vegetables 0.61 0.74 0.98 1.44 1.44 −0.01
(0.24) (0.29) (0.65) (0.44) (0.33) (0.31)
Note: Estimates based on the Full model with instrumental variables. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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